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Abstract
A major goal in Algorithmic Game Theory is to justify equilibrium concepts from an
algorithmic and complexity perspective. One appealing approach is to identify robust
natural distributed algorithms that converge quickly to an equilibrium. This paper ad-
dresses a lack of robustness in existing convergence results for discrete forms of taton-
nement, including the fact that it need not converge when buyers have linear utility
functions. This work achieves greater robustness by seeking approximate rather than
exact convergence in large market settings.
More specifically, this paper shows that for Fisher markets with buyers having CES
utility functions, including linear utility functions, tatonnement will converge quickly
to an approximate equilibrium (i.e. at a linear rate), modulo a suitable large market
assumption. The quality of the approximation is a function of the parameters of the
large market assumption.
1 Introduction
To show the plausibility of equilibrium concepts one would like simple, robust procedures
that quickly reach or at least approach an equilibrium state. But, as is well known, it is
PPAD-hard to compute equilibria for general economies [3, 14, 2]. Consequently (assuming
no unexpected complexity results such as PPAD = FP) there are no polynomial algorithms
to compute an equilibrium in markets in general, let alone simple, robust, and rapidly
convergent procedures.
As a result, considerable attention has been given to the design of polynomial time
algorithms to find equilibria for specific families of economies [15, 13, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25], and
also to the analysis of simple dynamic processes, most notably tatonnement [11, 6, 7, 4] and
proportional response [1, 26, 24, 8]. One class of economies that has received considerable
attention in the computer science literature are Fisher markets [12],1 which generalize the
equal income property of the CEEI setting [23] to arbitrary incomes.
This paper focuses on discrete versions of tatonnement. Recall that the tatonnement
update rule increases the price of a good when its demand is too high, and reduces it when
the demand is low. It is well known that tatonnement need not converge when buyer utilities
are linear as shown in the following simple example.
Example 1. There are two items, both with unit supply, and one buyer with 2 units of
money whose utility equals the sum of the amount of the two items it receives. Suppose we
use the update rule p′j = pj exp(λmin{xj − 1, 1}), where xj is the demand for good j, and
λ > 0 is a parameter; this is essentially the version of the tatonnement rule we will consider
in this paper, and a version that has been analyzed previously. Suppose the prices for the
two items are initially p1 = e
λ/2 and p2 = e
−λ/2, respectively. Then the demand for good
1 is 0 and the demand for good 2 is 2eλ/2, so following one round of updates, the prices
become p1 = e
−λ/2 and p2 = e
λ/2. On subsequent updates the prices keep interchanging, so
there is no convergence.
In addition, and unsurprisingly, as one approaches linear settings, the step size employed
by the tatonnement algorithm needs to be increasingly small, which leads to a slower rate
of convergence, and indicates a lack of robustness in the tatonnement procedure.
In this paper, we show that in suitable large Fisher markets, this lack of robustness
disappears, so long as approximate rather than exact convergence suffices. In addition, we
obtain fast, i.e. linear, convergence to an approximate equilibrium. To see why approximate
convergence is a reasonable and even the right goal, consider dynamical settings; in these
settings, the equilibrium state can be expected to change over time, and then the natural
convergence question becomes how closely can one track the moving equilibrium? The
answer is that it is a function of the rate of change and the market parameters, as analyzed
by Cheung et al. [9]. Clearly, in this type of setting, similar results will arise with an
approximate convergence result.
Our large market assumption requires that for goods with high elasticity, price changes
cause a relatively small change in spending. In the case of buyers with linear utility func-
tions, where the elasticity parameters are unbounded, this occurs if the buyers are hetero-
geneous, meaning the collection of their utility functions is quite varied; also, we need each
1In the CS literature the term market has been widely used to refer to economies; we follow this practice.
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individual buyer to constitute a small portion of the market and for the number of buyers
to be large compared to the number of goods.
To explain the intuition behind our results, we recall that Cheung, Cole and Devanur [6]
showed that for many types of economies, including those we consider here, a suitable
tatonnement update is equivalent to a form of mirror descent on a suitable convex function
(actually, mirror ascent on a concave function). To achieve convergence with mirror descent,
one needs the function F to have a bounded Lipschitz parameter L, namely that
||∇F (p)−∇F (q)|| ≤ L||p− q||,
for any two price vectors p and q. The rate of convergence will depend inversely on L. Our
large market assumption ensures this property so long as ||p− q|| is not too small.
In addition, the boundedness of the Lipschitz parameter holds only if the prices are
bounded away from 0. Prior analyses implicitly bounded this parameter by showing the
prices are bounded away from zero, though this bound depended on the initial prices and
the particulars of the market. In this paper, we assume there are minimum or reserve prices
which provides an alternate way to implicitly bound this parameter.
Furthermore, to obtain a linear rate of convergence one needs the function F (p) to be
strongly convex w.r.t. the equilibrium point p∗, namely:
F (p)− f(p∗) ≥ 〈∇F (p),p− p∗〉+ α||p− p∗||2.
Again, our large market assumption ensures this property so long as ||p − p∗|| is not too
small.
Related work Two natural dynamics have been studied in the context of Fisher markets,
tatonnement and proportional response.
The stability of the tatonnement process has been considered to be one of the most
fundamental issues in general equilibrium theory. Hahn [17] provides a thorough survey
on the topic, and the textbook of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [20] contains a good
summary of the classic results.
The longstanding interpretation of tatonnement is that it is a method used by an auction-
eer for iteratively updating prices, followed by trading at the equilibrium prices once they are
reached. If trading is allowed as the price updating occurs, this is called a non-tatonnement
process. In recent years, discrete versions of the (non)-tatonnement process have received
increased attention. Codenotti et al. [10] considered a tatonnement-like process that re-
quired some coordination among different goods and showed polynomial time convergence
for a class Fisher markets with weak gross substitutes (WGS) utilities. Cole and Fleis-
cher [11] were the first to establish fast convergence for a truly distributed, asynchronous
and discrete version of tatonnement, once again for a class of WGS Fisher markets. The
continued interest in the plausibility of tatonnement is also reflected in some experiments
by Hirota [18], which showed the predictive accuracy of tatonnement in a non-equilibrium
trade setting.
Proportional Response, in contrast, is a buyer-oriented update, originally analyzed in
an effort to explain the behavior of peer-to-peer networks [24, 26]. Here, buyers update
their spending in proportion to the contribution each good makes to its current utility.
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An O(1/T ) rate of convergence was shown in [1] for Fisher markets with buyers having
linear utilities, and for the substitutes domain excluding linear utilities, a faster linear rate
of convergence was shown in [26]. Recently, these results were generalized in [8] to the
complete domain of CES utilities.
We note that the fastest rate of convergence for linear utilities in prior work was O(1/T ).
In contrast, the present work provides a linear rate of convergence to an approximate
equilibrium for linear utilities (and indeed for the full set of utilities being considered,
namely all CES utilities excluding Leontief utilities).
Roadmap In Section 2 we review standard definitions and notation, and follow this with
the statement of our result. In Section 3 we provide a high level outline of our analysis,
which is expanded on in the following two sections. Finally, in Section 7 we mention some
related open problems. Some proofs and subsidiary lemmas are deferred to the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We use bold symbols, e.g., p,x, e, to denote vectors.
Fisher Market In a Fisher market, there are n perfectly divisible goods and m buyers.
Without loss of generality, the supply of each good j is normalized to be one unit. Each
buyer i has a utility function ui : R
n
+ → R, and a budget of size ei. At any given price
vector p ∈ Rn+, each buyer purchases a maximum utility affordable collection of goods.
More precisely, xi ∈ R
n
+ is said to be a demand of buyer i if xi ∈ argmaxx′: x′·p≤ei ui(x
′).
A price vector p∗ ∈ Rn+ is called a market equilibrium if at p
∗, for every buyer i there is
a demand xi such that
p∗j > 0 ⇒
m∑
i=1
xij = 1 and p
∗
j = 0 ⇒
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1.
The collection of xi is said to be an equilibrium allocation to the buyers.
If there are reserve prices r, then the prices are restricted to the domain p ≥ r, and in
the second equilibrium condition, p∗j = 0 is replaced by p
∗
j = rj.
CES utilities In this paper, each buyer i’s utility function is of the form
ui(xi) =

 n∑
j=1
aij · (xij)
ρi

1/ρi ,
for some −∞ ≤ ρi ≤ 1. ui(xi) is called a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility
function. They are a class of utility functions often used in economic analysis. The limit as
ρi → −∞ is called a Leontief utility, usually written as ui(xi) = minj
xij
cij
2; and the limit as
2Here, the utility function ui(x) = minj
xij
cij
can be seen as the limit of ui(x) =
(∑
j
(
xij
cij
)ρi ) 1ρi as ρi
tends to −∞.
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ρi → 0 is called a Cobb-Douglas utility, usually written as
∏
j xij
aij , with
∑
j aij = 1. The
utilities with ρi ≥ 0 capture goods that are substitutes, and those with ρi ≤ 0 goods that
are complements. It is sometimes convenient to write ci =
ρi
ρi−1
.
Notation Buyer i’s spending on good j, denoted by bij , is given by bij = xij ·pj . E =
∑
i ei
denotes the total spending available to all the buyers. zj =
∑
i xij − 1 denotes the excess
demand for good j. κ bounds the worst case ratio of the equilibrium and reserve prices:
κ ≥ maxj p
∗
j/rj . We sometimes index prices, spending, and demands by t to indicate the
relevant value at time t. Finally, we use a superscript of ∗ to indicate an equilibrium value.
Our large market assumption states that for the buyers with linear or close to linear
utilities, the spending on a single good does not vary too much as prices change. We define
“close to linear” in terms of a bound σ > 0 on the ρi parameters.
Assumption 1. [Large Market Assumption] There is a (small) constant ǫ > 0 such that
for those buyers with parameter ρi ≥ σ,∑
i:ρi≥σ
|btij − b
t+1
ij | ≤ ǫ
∑
i
btij + ǫrj.
In addition, the total available money E ≥ maxj rj.
Remark We validate our assumption in the following two settings. In the first setting
the market has only a few buyers with ρi bigger than σ. In this case, it’s easy to see that
the assumption holds if we set ǫ = max
{∑
i:ρi≥σ
ei
rj
}
.
Our second setting is a large linear market. The property we want is that for each good
j, when there are price changes by factors of at most e±λ, a relatively small weight of buyers
will be added to and removed from those currently purchasing good j (where the weight is
measured in terms of the buyers’ budgets.)
More specifically, btij differs from b
t+1
ij only if one of the following occur:
• there exists a k such that
aij
pt
j
≤ aik
pt
k
and
aij
pt+1j
≥ aik
pt+1
k
• there exists a k such that
aij
pt
j
≥ aik
pt
k
and
aij
pt+1j
≤ aik
pt+1
k
.
Note that our price update rule ensures that
pt+1
j
pt+1
k
∈ [e−2λ, e2λ]
ptj
pt
k
. Therefore, btij differs from
bt+1ij only if there exists a k such that
aij
aik
∈ [e−2λ, e2λ]
ptj
pt
k
. Also, since one of btij and b
t+1
ij is
non-zero, for all s,
aij
ais
≥
ptj
pts
e−2λ. Let qs ,
ptj
pts
. We conclude that
∑
i
|btij − b
t+1
ij | ≤
∑
i:


∃k:
aij
aik
∈[e−λqk,eλqk]
and ∀s
(
aij
ais
≥qse−λ
)
ei, (1)
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and ∑
i
btij ≥
∑
i:∀s 6=j
(
aij
ais
>qs
) ei. (2)
If the buyers are diverse, meaning that for any pair of goods, j and k say, the ra-
tios
aij
aik
vary substantially across the buyers, then so long as there are many buyers sat-
isfying the condition ∀s 6= j
(
aij
ais
> qs
)
in (2), it seems reasonable that their purchas-
ing power be much larger than that of the buyers satisfying the condition ∃k :
aij
aik
∈[
e−λqk, e
λqk
]
and ∀s
(
aij
ais
≥ qse
−λ
)
in (1). While if there are few buyers satisfying the
first condition, then it is reasonable to assume that only a small number of buyers will
switch their purchase to or from good j, and that this changed spending will be much
smaller than rj .
This motivates setting ǫ to be greater than or equal to
max
j,q:qk∈[
rk
E
, E
rk
]
{ ∑
i:


∃k:
aij
aik
∈[e−λqk,eλqk]
and ∀s
(
aij
ais
≥qse−λ
)
ei
/ ∑
i: ∀s
(
aij
ais
>qs
) ei + rj
}
,
causing our assumption to hold.
Our analysis is carried out with respect to the following potential function, which is the
dual of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program:
F(p) =
∑
j
pj +
∑
i
ei log max
xi·p=ei
ui(xi)
using the tatonnement update rule:
pt+1j = p
t
j · e
∆tj ,
where ∆tj = λmin{z
t
j , 1} and λ ≤ 1, unless this update would reduce p
t+1
j below the reserve
price, in which case ∆tj is chosen so that p
t+1
j = rj.
Our main result shows an initial linear rate of convergence toward the equilibrium, and
also shows that so long as the current prices are not too close to the equilibrium then there
is good progress toward the equilibrium. The latter statement can also be viewed as a result
regarding the tracking of a slowly moving equilibrium.
Before we state the main result, we define a parameter C(κ) introduced in [5]. Here
κ is an upper bound on the ratio maxj
p∗j
rj
. C(κ) = min
{
hc(κ)
c ,
κ−1−logκ
(κ−1)2
}
, where hc(κ) =
1−κc+c(κ−1)
(κ−1)2
for any κ ≥ 0 except κ = 1, and hc(1) =
c(1−c)
2 and c = maxi ci. Note that
c < 1.
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Theorem 1. For any 0 < θ < 1, if λσ1−σ ≤ 1 and κ ≥ maxj
p∗j
rj
, then
F(pt)− F(p∗) ≤ (1− α)t
(
F(p0)− F(p∗)
)
+ 2
λǫ2M
αθ
,
where α =
(1−λ−2λ·max{ σ1−σ ,1}−2ǫ−2θ)
maxj
{
max
{
2, 1
2C(κ)
}
E
λrj
} andM = max
{∑
j p
0
j ,
((
eλ − 2λ
)
1+2λ−eλ
λ + λ
)(
E +
∑
j rj
)}
.
Furthermore, if F(pt)− F(p∗) ≥ 4λǫ
2M
αθ then
F(pt+1)− F(p∗) ≤
(
1−
α
2
) (
F(pt)− F(p∗)
)
.
In Section 6, we show a variant of this theorem which demonstrates that in dynamical
settings, i.e. setting in which the equilibrium point changes over time, but not too quickly,
this changing equilibrium can be tracked using tatonnement updates.
3 A High Level Overview of the Analysis
The analysis is largely based on deriving two bounds. The first is a progress lemma, a lower
bound on the reduction in value of F (p) due to the time t update, stated in Lemma 1 below.
The second is an upper bound on the distance to the equilibrium, stated in Lemma 2 below.
We also need to relate the sum of the prices at time t+1 to the corresponding sum for time
0, as stated in Lemma 3. Our main result then follows fairly readily.
With a slight abuse of notation, we let ui(bi,p) denote buyer i’s utility when spending
bi at prices p.
We analyze the change to the potential function due to the time t updates. Note that
since buyers best respond, maxxi·p=ei ui(xi) = ui(b
t
i,p
t). So,
F(pt+1)− F(pt) =
∑
j
(pt+1j − p
t
j) +
∑
i
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
. (3)
Lemma 1. For any 0 < σ < 1 such that λσ1−σ ≤ 1, if |∆
t
j | ≤ λ|min{z
t
j , 1}| and sign(∆
t
j) =
sign(min{ztj , 1}), then
F(pt)− F(pt+1) ≥
(
1− λ− 2λ ·max
{
σ
1− σ
, 1
})∑
j
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j −
∑
i:ρi≥σ
ρi
∑
j
(
btij − b
t+1
ij
)
∆tj.
To obtain an upper bound on F(p)− F(p∗) we follow the approach taken in [5]. They
pointed out that if
p∗j
pj
≤ κ for all j, then
F(p∗)− F(p)− 〈∇F(p),p∗ − p〉 ≥
∑
j
C(κ)xj
(p∗j − pj)
2
pj
, (4)
where C(κ) is a suitable parameter we specify later. We note that this is a strong convexity
bound of the type we need for a linear convergence rate.
We will show:
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Lemma 2. If κ ≥ maxj
p∗j
rj
, then
F(pt)−F(p∗) ≤
∑
j
max
{
2,
1
2C(κ)
}
E
λrj
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j .
Finally, the bound on the sum of the prices is stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. Using the definition of M from Theorem 1 gives
∑
j
pt+1j ≤ max

∑
j
p0j ,
((
eλ − 2λ
) 1 + 2λ− eλ
λ
+ λ
)E +∑
j
rj



 =M.
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. We will be applying Lemma 1, and we begin by bounding the second
term on the RHS of the expression there.∑
i:ρi≥σ
ρi
∑
j
(
btij − b
t+1
ij
)
∆tj ≤
∑
i:ρi≥σ
ρi
∑
j
∣∣∣btij − bt+1ij ∣∣∣ ∣∣∆tj∣∣
≤
∑
i:ρi≥σ
∑
j
∣∣∣btij − bt+1ij ∣∣∣ ∣∣∆tj∣∣ .
By Assumption 1 for the first inequality, and because ptj ≥ rj for the second inequality,
∑
i:ρi≥σ
ρi
∑
j
(
btij − b
t+1
ij
)
∆tj ≤
∑
j
(ǫ
∑
i
btij + ǫrj)
∣∣∆tj∣∣ =∑
j
(ǫptj(1 + z
t
j) + ǫrj)
∣∣∆tj∣∣
≤
∑
j
2ǫptj
∣∣∆tj∣∣+ ǫptjztj ∣∣∆tj∣∣ ≤∑
j
2ǫptj
∣∣∆tj∣∣+ ǫptjztj∆tj. (5)
We use the following result: for any θ > 0,
∑
j
2ǫptj
∣∣∆tj∣∣ ≤∑
j
2θptjz
t
j∆
t
j + 2
λǫ2
θ
∑
j
ptj . (6)
This holds because if ǫptj
∣∣∣∆tj∣∣∣ ≥ θptjztj∆tj, then ǫ ≥ θ|ztj|. Therefore
2ǫptj
∣∣∆tj∣∣ ≤ 2λǫ2θ ptj.
Substituting (5) and (6) in Lemma 1 yields
F(pt)−F(pt+1) ≥
(
1− λ− 2λ ·max
{
σ
1− σ
, 1
}
− 2ǫ− 2θ
)∑
j
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j − 2
λǫ2
θ
∑
j
ptj
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Applying Lemma 3 gives
F(pt)− F(pt+1) ≥
(
1− λ− 2λ ·max
{
σ
1− σ
, 1
}
− 2ǫ− 2θ
)∑
j
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j − 2
λǫ2
θ
M. (7)
Applying Lemma 2 and recalling that α =
(1−λ−2λ·max{ σ1−σ ,1}−2ǫ−2θ)
maxj
{
max
{
2, 1
2C(κj )
}
E
λrj
} yields:
F(pt)− F(pt+1) ≥ α[F (pt)− F (p∗)]− 2
λǫ2
θ
M.
Our first claim follows readily:
F(pt+1)− F(p∗) ≤ (1− α)
(
F(pt)− F(p∗)
)
+ 2
λǫ2
θ
M (8)
≤ (1− α)t
(
F(p0)− F(p∗)
)
+ 2
λǫ2M
θ
(
1 + (1− α) + (1− α)2 + · · ·
)
≤ (1− α)t
(
F(p0)− F(p∗)
)
+ 2
λǫ2M
αθ
.
To prove the second claim, recall that we are assuming F(pt)−F(p∗) ≤ 4λǫ
2
αθM. Then,
by (8),
F(pt+1)− F(p∗) ≤ (1− α)
(
F(pt)− F(p∗)
)
+
α
2
F(pt)− F(p∗)
≤ (1−
α
2
)
(
F(pt)− F(p∗)
)
.
4 The Proof of Lemma 1, the Progress Lemma
The starting point for our analysis is (3). The first step is to bound log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1
i )
ui(bti,p
t
i)
. The
next four lemmas provide a variety of bounds depending on the value of ρi and other
parameters.
Lemma 4. If buyer i has a linear utility function, then
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1
i )
ui(bti,p
t
i)
≤ −
∑
j
btij∆
t
j +
∑
j
(btij − b
t+1
ij )∆
t
j.
Lemma 5. For any 0 < ρi < 1, if |∆
t
j| ≤ 1 for all j and t, then
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
≤ −
∑
j
btij∆
t
j +
∑
j
btijρi
(
∆tj
)2
− ρi
∑
j
bt+1ij ∆
t
j + ρi
∑
j
btij∆
t
j.
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Lemma 6. For any ρi > 0, if |λci| ≤ 1 and |∆
t
j| ≤ 1 for all j and t, then
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
≤ −
∑
j
btij∆
t
j −
∑
j
btijci
(
∆tj
)2
.
Lemma 7. If buyer i has a complementary utility function, then
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1
i )
ui(bti,p
t
i)
≤ −
∑
j
btij∆
t
j .
We are now ready to prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1: Recall that ci =
ρi
ρi−1
, and σ is a threshold designating the buyers
to which Assumption 1 applies, namely those with ρi ≥ σ. We apply Lemma (6) to the
buyers with 0 < ρi ≤ σ. In order to apply Lemma (6), it suffices to have
λ ·
σ
1− σ
≤ 1.
Therefore, by Lemmas 4–7 and equation (3), for any 0 < σ < 1 such that λ σ1−σ ≤ 1,
F(pt+1)− F(pt) =
∑
j
pj(e
∆tj − 1)−
∑
ij
btij∆
t
j
−
∑
ij:0<ρi<σ
btijci(∆
t
j)
2 +
∑
ij:σ≤ρi<1
btijρi(∆
t
j)
2
+
∑
i:ρi≥σ
ρi
∑
j
(
btij − b
t+1
ij
)
∆tj
=
∑
j
pj(e
∆tj −∆tj − 1)−
∑
j
(
∑
i
btij − p
t
j)∆
t
j
−
∑
ij:0<ρi<σ
btijci(∆
t
j)
2 +
∑
ij:σ≤ρi<1
btijρi(∆
t
j)
2
+
∑
i:ρi≥σ
ρi
∑
j
(
btij − b
t+1
ij
)
∆tj.
Note that e∆
t
j −∆tj − 1 ≤
(
∆tj
)2
as |∆tj | ≤ 1, and
∑
i b
t
ij − p
t
j = p
t
jz
t
j . Therefore,
F(pt+1)− F(pt) ≤
∑
j
pj
(
∆tj
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
−
∑
j
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
−
∑
ij:ρi<σ
btijci(∆
t
j)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+
∑
ij:σ≤ρi<1
btijρi(∆
t
j)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
+
∑
i:ρi≥σ
ρi
∑
j
(
btij − b
t+1
ij
)
∆tj.
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It is easy to see that A ≤ λB if |∆tj| ≤ λ|min{z
t
j , 1}| and sign(∆
t
j) = sign(min{z
t
j , 1}).
Next, we will bound C and D in terms of B. To this end, we note that we can omit the
portion of C with ρi ≤ 0 as for these terms ci ≥ 0 and consequently removing them only
increases the RHS expression. We then note that for ρi > 0,
−ci = −
ρi
ρi − 1
≤ −
σ
σ − 1
=
σ
σ − 1
.
For term D we use the simple bound ρi ≤ 1. Thus terms C and D are bounded by∑
i,j:ρi>0
max
{
σ
σ − 1
, 1
}
btij
(
∆tj
)2
.
We now give a bound on this expression in terms of B.
Claim 8. If |∆tj| ≤ λ|min{z
t
j , 1}| and sign(∆
t
j) = sign(min{z
t
j , 1}), then
∑
j
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j ≥
1
2λ
(∑
i
btij
)
(∆tj)
2.
Thus
F(pt)− F(pt+1) ≥
∑
j
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j
(
1− λ− 2λmax
{
σ
σ − 1
, 1
})
.
5 Bounding the Distance to the Optimum
In this section, we provide an upper bound on F(p)− F(p∗).
Equation (4) yields
F(pt)− F(p∗) ≤
∑
j
ztj(p
∗
j − p
t
j)−
∑
j
C(κj)x
t
j
(p∗j − p
t
j)
2
ptj
≤ max
p′≥r
∑
j
(
ztj(p
′
j − p
t
j)− C(κj)x
t
j
(p′j − p
t
j)
2
ptj
)
. (9)
In [5], they prove that
max
p′
(
ztj(p
′
j − p
t
j)− C(κj)x
t
j
(p′j − p
t
j)
2
ptj
)
≤ max
{
2,
1
2C(κj)
}(
ztj
)2
ptj. (10)
Here, we want to prove one more upper bound.
Lemma 9. If pt+1j = rj and z
t
j ≤ 0, then
max
p′j≥rj
(
ztj(p
′
j − p
t
j)− C(κj)x
t
j
(p′j − p
t
j)
2
ptj
)
≤ ztjp
t
j log
pt+1j
ptj
.
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It’s easy to see that our update rule has ∆tj = log
pt+1j
ptj
. Now, combining (9), (10), and
Lemma 9, yields Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 9: Let
I(p′j) = z
t
j(p
′
j − p
t
j)− C(κj)x
t
j
(p′j − p
t
j)
2
ptj
and in the setting without reserve prices, let
poptj = max
p′j
{
I(p′j)
}
.
In this case, the maximum value of I(p′) is(
ztj
)2
ptj
4C(κj)xj
,
and the optimum value is
poptj = p
t
j +
ztjp
t
j
2C(κj)xtj
.
Case 1: poptj ≥ rj .
This implies
ptj +
ztjp
t
j
2C(κj)xtj
≥ rj .
Therefore, since ztj ≤ 0, (
ztj
)2
ptj
4C(κj)xj
≤
1
2
ztjp
t
j
rj − p
t
j
ptj
≤
1
2
ztjp
t
j log
rj
ptj
.
Case 2: poptj < rj .
Note that I(p′j) is a quadratic function. On the domain p
′
j ≥ rj , it achieves its maximum
value when p′j = rj. Therefore, the maximum value is(
ztj
)2
ptj
4C(κj)xj
−
C(κj)x
t
j
ptj
(rj − p
opt
j )
2 =
(
ztj
)2
ptj
4C(κj)xj
−
C(κj)x
t
j
ptj
(
rj − p
t
j −
ztjp
t
j
2C(κj)x
t
j
)2
= −C(κj)x
t
j
(rj − p
t
j)
2
ptj
+ ztj(rj − p
t
j)
Since C(κj)x
t
j
(rj−ptj)
2
ptj
≥ 0, this is less than
ztj(rj − p
t
j) ≤ z
t
jp
t
j
rj − p
t
j
ptj
≤ ztjp
t
j log
rj
ptj
.
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Proof of Lemma 2: Case 1: pt+1j > r
t
j.
Then ∆tj = λmin{z
t
j , 1}. Note that z
t
j =
∑
i b
t
ij−p
t
j
ptj
≤ Erj . Therefore, |∆
t
j | ≥
λrj
E |z
t
j |. Since
∆tj and z
t
j are both positive or both negative, combining with (9) and (10) yields
F(pt)− F(p∗) ≤ max
{
2,
1
2C(κj)
}
(ztj)
2ptj ≤ max
{
2,
1
2C(κj)
}
E
λrj
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j.
Case 2: pt+1j = r
t
j .
By (9) and using Lemma 9, the result follows as ∆tj = log
pt+1j
ptj
, and E ≥ rj by assumption.
6 Dynamical Markets
In this section, we will consider dynamical market. For each round, there can be a small
change to the supplies, budgets and buyers’ preferences. We will seek to show that taton-
nement can cause the prices to pursue the market equilibrium. Note that, in general, we
need to modify the potential function to account for the possibly changing supplies wtj for
item j at time t; the new potential function is∑
j
wtjp
t
j +
∑
i
ei log max
xi·pt=eti
ui(xi),
and our update rule will be
pt+1j = p
t
je
∆tj
where ∆tj = λmax
{
ztj
wj
, 1
}
.
Cheung, Hoefer, and Nakhe [9] analyze the following settings:
• Supply Change If at time t, the supplies change by at most ǫ, then by at most (P+E)ǫ,
where P is the maximum price at time t+ 1;
• Budget Change If at time t, the sum of the absolute values of the changes to the
buyers’ budgets is at most ǫ, then the potential function changes by at most Cǫ,
where C is the maximum possible ratio between a buyer’s utility at time t + 1 and
her utility at the market equilibrium at time t+ 1;
• Utility Change If at time t, given any prices, the ratio of the utility difference when
best responding is bounded by χ, then the potential function changes by at most 2Eχ.
In order to analyze the effect of these changes over time, in this paper, we let D denote the
maximum change to the potential function at each round. We let pt,∗ denote the equilibrium
prices at time t. We have the following theorem.
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Theorem 2. For any 0 < θ < 1, if λσ1−σ ≤ 1 and κ ≥ maxj
p∗j
rj
, then
Ft+1(pt+1)− Ft+1(pt+1,∗) ≤ (1− α)t
(
F(p0)− F(p0,∗)
)
+
1
α
(
2
λǫ2M
θ
+D
)
,
where α =
(1−λ−2λ·max{ σ1−σ ,1}−2ǫ−2θ)
maxj
{
max
{
2, 1
2C(κ)
}
E
λrj
} andM = max
{∑
j wˆjp
0
j ,
((
eλ − 2λ
)
1+2λ−eλ
λ + λ
)(
E +
∑
j rj
)}
.
Also, E here will be the maximum possible total money over time and wˆj will be the max-
imum supply of item j over time. Furthermore, if Ft(pt) − Ft(pt,∗) ≥ 2α
(
2λǫ2M
θ +D
)
then
Ft+1(pt+1)− Ft+1(pt+1,∗) ≤
(
1−
α
2
) (
Ft(pt)− Ft(p∗)
)
.
Proof. This theorem follows directly if we replace 2λǫ
2M
θ by 2
λǫ2M
θ +D in (7).
7 Discussion and Open Questions
The strong convexity of the function F (p) reduces as complementarity increases and disap-
pears when Leontief utility functions are allowed. Is there a suitable large market assump-
tion that will create strong convexity in the large when these utility functions are present?
Also, do the current results extend to asynchronous updating as used in the Ongoing Market
model of Cole and Fleischer [11] and elsewhere [7, 8]?
Do analogous results hold for Proportional Response? Note that for CES utility func-
tions, there is a convex function on which mirror descent corresponds to the Proportional
Response update [8], and this function is strongly convex away from the extremes of linear
and Leontief utility functions (actually, the situation is more complicated; the function is a
mix of concave and convex).
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A Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3:∑
j
pt+1j =
∑
j
ptje
∆tj =
∑
j
ptj
(
e∆
t
j − 1−∆tj
)
+
∑
j
ptj
(
1 + ∆tj
)
.
If pt+1j = rj , then p
t
j
(
1 + ∆tj
)
≤ ptje
∆tj = rj ≤ (1 − λ)p
t
j + λrj. Otherwise, p
t
j
(
1 + ∆tj
)
≤
ptj
(
1 + λztj
)
= (1− λ)ptj + λ
∑
i b
t
ij. This implies
∑
j
pt+1j ≤
∑
j
ptj
(
e∆
t
j − 1−∆tj
)
+ λ
∑
j
rj + (1− λ)
∑
j
ptj + λ
∑
ij
btij .
Since |∆tj | ≤ λ, e
∆tj − 1−∆tj ≤ max
{
eλ − 1− λ, e−λ − 1 + λ
}
≤ eλ − 1− λ.
∑
j
pt+1j ≤
(
eλ − 1− λ
)∑
j
ptj + λ
∑
j
rj + (1− λ)
∑
j
ptj + λ
∑
ij
btij. (11)
If
∑
j p
t
j ≥
(
1+2λ−eλ
λ
)(∑
ij b
t
ij +
∑
j rj
)
, then rearranging (11) gives
∑
j p
t+1
j ≤
∑
j p
t
j .
Otherwise, replacing
∑
j p
t
j by
(
1+2λ−eλ
λ
)(∑
ij b
t
ij +
∑
j rj
)
gives∑
j p
t+1
j ≤
((
eλ − 2λ
)
1+2λ−eλ
λ + λ
)(
E +
∑
j rj
)
. Thus∑
j p
t+1
j ≤ max
{∑
j p
t
j,
((
eλ − 2λ
)
1+2λ−eλ
λ + λ
)(
E +
∑
j rj
)}
and the result follows by
induction on t.
Proof of Lemma 4: For simplicity, we can assume that at any given time each buyer
will spend all her money on just one item. To handle the general case, we partition each
buyer into several buyers, each of whom buys one good. Then the same result follows.
So, here we use j(i,p) to denote the item with max utility-per-dollar for buyer i at price
p and buyer i spends the whole budget on this item. Note that
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1
i )
ui(bti,p
t
i)
= ei log
aij(i,pt+1)
pt+1
j(i,pt+1)
− ei log
aij(i,pt)
ptj(i,pt)
= ei log
aij(i,pt+1)p
t+1
j(i,pt)
aij(i,pt)p
t+1
j(i,pt+1)
− btij(i,pt) log
pt+1j(i,pt)
ptj(i,pt)
= ei log
aij(i,pt+1)p
t+1
j(i,pt)
aij(i,pt)p
t+1
j(i,pt+1)
− btij(i,pt)∆
t
j(i,pt). (12)
We also know that
aij(i,pt)
pt+1j(i,pt)
=
aij(i,pt)
ptj(i,pt)e
∆t
j(i,pt)
≥
aij(i,pt+1)
pt
j(i,pt+1)
e
∆t
j(i,pt)
=
aij(i,pt+1)e
∆t
j(i,pt+1)
pt+1
j(i,pt+1)
e
∆t
j(i,pt)
.
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Therefore,
ei log
aij(i,pt+1)p
t+1
j(i,pt)
aij(i,pt)p
t+1
j(i,pt+1)
≤ ei(∆
t
j(i,pt) −∆
t
j(i,pt+1)) =
∑
j
(btij − b
t+1
ij )∆
t
j . (13)
To see the final equality, note that bij(i,pt) = ei and bij = 0 for all other j; so
∑
j b
t
ij∆
t
j =
ei∆
t
j(i,pt); likewise,
∑
bt+1ij ∆
t
j = ei∆
t
j(i,pt+1).
Combining (12) and (13) yields the result.
The remaining lemmas use the following observations from [5].
max
xi·p=ei
ui(xi) =

 ei
(∑
j a
1−ci
ij p
ci
j
)− 1
ci ρi < 1
ei
aij
pj
ρi = 1
, (14)
And the best response to price p is
bij = ei
a1−ciij p
ci
j∑
j′ a
1−ci
ij′ p
ci
j′
. (15)
Proof of Lemma 5: First, we decompose the LHS into two parts:
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
= ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t+1)
+ ei log
ui(b
t
i,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
.
We start by bounding the first term. Note that
ui(bi,p) =

∑
j
aij
(
bij
pj
)ρi
1
ρi
.
Using (15) yields:
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t+1)
=
ei
ρi
log
∑
j aij


ei
a
1−ci
ij
(pt+1
j
)ci
∑
j′
a
1−ci
ij′
(pt+1
j′
)ci
pt+1
j


ρi
∑
j aij


ei
a
1−ci
ij
(pt
j
)ci
∑
j′
a
1−ci
ij′
(pt
j′
)ci
pt+1j


ρi
=
ei
ρi
log
∑
j aij
(
a
1−ci
ij (p
t+1
j )
ci
pt+1j
)ρi
∑
j aij
(
a
1−ci
ij (p
t
j)
ci
pt+1j
)ρi + ei log
∑
j′ a
1−ci
ij′ (p
t
j′)
ci∑
j′ a
1−ci
ij′ (p
t+1
j′ )
ci
.
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By calculation, 1 + (1− ci)ρi = 1− ci and (ci − 1)ρi = ci. So,
∑
j
aij
(
a1−ciij (p
t+1
j )
ci
pt+1j
)ρi
=
∑
j
a1−ciij
(
pt+1j
)ci
and
∑
j
aij
(
a1−ciij (p
t
j)
ci
pt+1j
)ρi
=
∑
j
a1−ciij
(
ptj
)ci ( ptj
pt+1j
)ρi
Therefore,
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t+1)
= ei
1− ρi
ρi
log
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
pt+1j
)ci
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
ptj
)ci ( ptj
pt+1j
)ρi + ei log
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
ptj
)ci
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
ptj
)ci ( ptj
pt+1j
)ρi .
Note that, by (15), bt+1ij = ei
a
1−ci
ij (p
t+1
j )
ci
∑
j′ a
1−ci
ij′
(
pt+1
j′
)ci and btij = ei
a
1−ci
ij (p
t
j)
ci
∑
j′ a
1−ci
ij′
(
pt
j′
)ci . Thus
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t+1)
= −ei
1− ρi
ρi
log
∑
j
bt+1ij
ei
(
ptj
pt+1j
)ρi (
ptj
pt+1j
)ci
− ei log
∑
j
btij
ei
(
ptj
pt+1j
)ρi
.
As the log function is concave, log
∑
i aixi ≥
∑
i ai log xi when
∑
i ai = 1; this yields:
ei
1− ρi
ρi
log
∑
j
bt+1ij
ei
(
ptj
pt+1j
)ρi (
ptj
pt+1j
)ci
≥
∑
j
bt+1ij (ρi + ci)
1− ρi
ρi
log
ptj
pt+1j
= −ρi
∑
j
bt+1ij log
ptj
pt+1j
and ei log
∑
j
btij
ei
(
ptj
pt+1j
)ρi
≥ ρi
∑
j
btij log
ptj
pt+1j
.
Therefore,
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(b
t
i,p
t+1)
≤ ρi
∑
j
bt+1ij log
ptj
pt+1j
− ρi
∑
j
btij log
ptj
pt+1j
= −ρi
∑
j
bt+1ij ∆
t
j + ρi
∑
j
btij∆
t
j. (16)
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Now let’s look at the second part, ei log
ui(b
t
i,p
t+1)
ui(bti ,p
t)
.
ei log
ui(b
t
i,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
=
ei
ρi
log
∑
j aij


ei
a
1−ci
ij
(ptj )
ci
∑
j′
a
1−ci
ij′
(pt
j′
)ci
pt+1j


ρi
∑
j aij


ei
a
1−ci
ij
(pt
j
)ci
∑
j′
a
1−ci
ij′
(pt
j′
)ci
ptj


ρi
=
ei
ρi
log
∑
j aij
(
a
1−ci
ij (p
t
j)
ci
pt+1j
)ρi
∑
j aij
(
a
1−ci
ij (p
t
j)
ci
ptj
)ρi .
Recall that 1 + (1− ci)ρi = 1− ci and (ci − 1)ρi = ci. So,
ei log
ui(b
t
i,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
=
ei
ρi
log
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
ptj
)ci ( ptj
pt+1j
)ρi
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
ptj
)ci .
Remember that btij = ei
a
1−ci
ij (ptj)
ci
∑
j′ a
1−ci
ij′
(
pt
j′
)ci . Therefore,
ei log
ui(b
t
i,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
=
ei
ρi
log
∑
j
btij
ei
(
ptj
pt+1j
)ρi
≤
ei
ρi
∑
j
btij
ei
((
ptj
pt+1j
)ρi
− 1
)
,
using the fact that log x ≤ x− 1 for the last inequality, and noting that
∑
j b
t
ij = ei.
As
pt+1j
ptj
= e∆
t
j and |∆tj| ≤ 1,(
ptj
pt+1j
)ρi
− 1
ρi
≤ −∆tj + ρi
(
∆tj
)2
.
Therefore,
ei log
ui(b
t
i,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
≤ −
∑
j
btij∆
t
j +
∑
j
btijρi
(
∆tj
)2
. (17)
Combining (16) and (17) gives the result.
The following claim is used in the final two results.
Claim 10. If ρ < 1,
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
= −
ei
ci
log
∑
j
btij
ei
(
pt+1j
ptj
)ci
.
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Proof. As ρi < 1, by (14), maxxi·p=ei ui(xi) = ei
(∑
j a
1−ci
ij p
ci
j
)− 1
ci . Thus,
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
= −
ei
ci
log
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
pt+1j
)ci
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
ptj
)ci .
Substituting from (15) gives
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(bti,p
t)
= −
ei
ci
log
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
pt+1j
)ci
∑
j a
1−ci
ij
(
ptj
)ci = −eici log
∑
j
btij
ei
(
pt+1j
ptj
)ci
.
Proof of Lemma 6: By applying Claim 10, and noting that pt+1j = p
t
je
∆tj and |∆tj | ≤ λ
and ci < 0, yields
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1)
ui(b
t
i,p
t)
= −
ei
ci
log
∑
j
btij
ei
(
pt+1j
ptj
)ci
≤ −
ei
ci
∑
j
btij
ei
[(
pt+1j
ptj
)ci
− 1
]
(using log x ≤ x− 1)
= −
ei
ci
∑
j
btij
ei
(
eci∆
t
j − 1
)
≤ −
∑
j
btij
ci∆
t
j +
(
ci∆
t
j
)2
ci
(using ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2 if −1 ≤ x = ci∆
t
j ≤ 1)
= −
∑
j
btij∆
t
j −
∑
j
btijci
(
∆tj
)2
.
Proof of Lemma 7: As ρ ≤ 0, by Claim 10,
ei log
ui(b
t+1
i ,p
t+1
i )
ui(bti,p
t
i)
= −
ei
ci
log
∑
j
btij
ei
(
pt+1j
ptj
)ci
≤ −
ei
ci
∑
j
btij
ei
log
(
pt+1j
ptj
)ci
≤ −
∑
j
btij∆
t
j.
The first inequality holds as log is a concave function, ci > 0 for complementary buyers,
and
∑
j
btij
ei
= 1; the final inequality uses ∆tj = log
pt+1j
ptj
.
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Proof of Claim 8: If zj = −1 then
∑
j b
t
ij = 0 and the claim holds. Otherwise, zj > −1
and
ptjz
t
j∆
t
j =
(∑
i
btij − pj
)
∆tj =

∑
j
btij

(1− 1
1 + ztj
)
∆tj
≥
(∑
i
btij
)1− 1
1 +
∆tj
λ

∆tj.
If ztj ≥ 0, then 0 ≤
∆tj
λ ≤ 1. This implies
1−
1
1 +
∆tj
λ
≥
∆tj
2λ
;
and if ztj < 0, then −λ < ∆
t
j ≤ 0. This implies
1−
1
1 +
∆tj
λ
≤
∆tj
λ
<
∆tj
2λ
.
The result now follows.
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